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ABSTRACT

installations are denied energy and water resources. In
partnership with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment (ODASA
IE&E), a team at the United States Military Academy (USMA)
has investigated opportunities to improve the resilience of
installations. This body of work describes some of the initial
findings and methodologies from the research effort.
The 2021 Texas power outage serves as a prime example
of the cascading effects of outages [1]. The outage stemmed
from an extreme cold weather event that, among other things,
froze water pipes across the state. The lack of water flow
created an immediate issue for citizens due to the lack of
running water, but it also caused a follow-on issue by shutting
down natural gas power plants therefore cutting off electricity
to millions of consumers [2]. The isolation of the Texas power
grid prevented electricity from being allocated from other
states. Prior to the event, many energy stakeholders in the state
of Texas had not prepared equipment for the possibility of
extreme low temperatures that persisted for numerous days,
resulting in devastating effects. These stakeholders include the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), natural gas
suppliers, power plant operators, electricity and water utilities,
local municipalities, residential and commercial building
owners, and nearly every other major institution in the state that
is tasked with sourcing, managing, and delivering energy to
consumers. A “black swan event,” as described by Nassim
Nicholas Taleb, “lies outside the realm of regular expectations,
carries an extreme impact,” and is “retrospective,” as “humans
concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it
explainable and predictable [3].” If such an outage occurred on
an Army installation, the potential impact could be immense,
showcasing a necessary change in how such events are
considered in measuring resilience standards. As will be
described herein, this body of work resulted in the modeling of

Reliable performance of energy and water infrastructure is
central to the mission readiness of the United States Army.
These systems are vulnerable to coordinated attacks from an
adversary as well as disruption from natural events. The
objectives of this work were to investigate Army installations in
North America, identify best practices for improving the
resilience and sustainability of critical energy and water
infrastructure, and develop a framework and methodology for
analyzing the resilience of an installation under varying outage
scenarios. This work was accomplished using a multi-layered
decision process to identify unique case studies from the 117
active-duty domestic Army installations. A framework for
analyzing and assessing the resilience of an installation was
then developed to help inform stakeholders. Metered energy
and water data from buildings across Fort Benning, GA were
curated to inform the modeling framework, including a
discrete-event simulation of the supply and demand for energy
and water on the installation using ProModel. This simulation
was used to study the scale of solutions required to address
outage events of varying frequency, duration, and magnitude,
the combination of which is described as the severity of outages
at a given site. This project helps develop a framework to inform
how installations might meet Army Directive 2020-03, which
states that installations must be able to sustain mission
requirements for a minimum of 14 days after a disruption has
occurred.
Keywords: Energy, Water, Resilience, Infrastructure
1. INTRODUCTION
Army Directive 2020-03 establishes the requirement that
installations be able to sustain mission critical operations for 14
days in the event of an outage. The impetus for this directive is
the recognition that the United States Army will be impaired if
1
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diverse outage scenarios, the assessment of how changes to
energy infrastructure could improve resilience, and the
development of a framework for measuring outage costs at
Army installations.

of an EDG is directly affected by the state of maintenance and
measurable by operational availability, probability that the
generator will fail to start, the mean time until failure, and the
mean time between failures [13], [14].
A battery energy storage system (BESS) may be deployed
to prevent the loss of critical loads and reduce electrical demand
charges by providing load shifting, dynamic local voltage
support, short-term frequency smoothing, grid contingency
support, and reduce the need for fossil-fuel-based energy
generation [15], [16]. In some cases, a BESS can act as a direct
replacement of an EDG; however, BESS are limited in terms of
duration compared with an EDG if ample supply of diesel is
available. The configuration of a BESS is a key factor to
assessing its reliability and resilience within specific systems.
The total reliability of a traditional BESS is less than the
reliability of its individual components since traditional BESS
designs connect components in series [17]. In a reconfigured
BESS (RBESS) the failure of one battery module does not
cause the entire BESS to fail. In an RBESS, each battery
module is controlled by its own individual converter module. In
the event of a failure, the battery module can be isolated or
replaced without causing system failure [17]. These BESS are
used in partnership with traditional energy generation such as
EDGs. Aggregated BESS are used for renewable energy
sources and consist of multiple BESS [18]. The reliability of an
ABESS is determined by “up” and “down” time, defining
operational time. This type of system is designed to be
connected to a microgrid. The usage of a BESS system depends
heavily on the requirements of the system, which will yield
differing levels of reliability and value towards resiliency.
Microgrids (MG) are “electricity distribution systems
containing loads and distributed energy resources, (such as
distributed generators, storage devices, or controllable loads)
that can be operated in a controlled, coordinated way either
while connected to the main power network or while islanded”
[13]. Adding MGs to Army installations would allow the
system to remain functional in the case of an event where the
system lost connection to the main power network.
The reliable access to potable water through water
treatment systems is of primal importance for human life and
Army operations. Throughout all factors of the water system,
there were two general findings on how to improve resilience.
The use of backup generation and system redundancies were
the two strongest ways to improve water system resiliency [18],
[19]. In practice, this could be a decentralized system with
multiple small-scale plants that are individually more
vulnerable to breakdown or attack, but produces a more
resilient system the system is stronger [19].
The electric grid in the United States is characterized by
three main subsections: generation, transmission, and
distribution. Energy generation encompasses traditional fossil
fuel generation in addition to opportunities for the use of
alternative fuels. U.S. electricity markets have wholesale and
retail components. Wholesale markets involve the sale of
electricity among electric utilities and electricity traders before

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Resilience can be broadly defined as a system’s ability to
recover from failure, with two nuanced definitions. Engineering
resilience draws attention to “efficiency, constancy, and
predictability” which represent the core values of fail-safe
engineering design [4]. Ecological resilience emphasizes the
importance of “persistence, change, and unpredictability” as
critical to the definition of a resilient system. A deviation from
these two base definitions is the concept of adaptive resilience
which assumes that a system undergoes constant change and
will never “return” to a state of equilibrium after a disruption
[5]. United States Code Title 10 defined military installation
resilience as the “capability of a military installation to avoid,
prepare for, minimize the effect of, adapt to, and recover from
extreme weather events, or from…changes in environmental
conditions, that…adversely affect the military installation or
essential transportation, logistical, or other necessary
resources…that are necessary in order to maintain, improve, or
rapidly reestablish installation mission assurance and missionessential functions” [6]. This definition of system resilience
adequately encompasses all the nuances in US Army doctrine
and published orders. It is narrowly tailored to meet the strictest
definition of resilience, to ensure the goal of consistent mission
readiness.
To meet the goal of increasing energy resilience one must
understand the basic sources and definitions of energy and
power. The majority of primary energy supply in the United
States is sourced from fossil fuels; however, deployment of
renewable sources such as wind and solar has grown [7]. The
Energy Information Administration (EIA) defines renewable
energy as “energy from sources that are naturally replenishing
but flow-limited; renewable resources are virtually
inexhaustible in duration but limited in the amount of energy
that is available per unit of time [8], [9].” In the case of an
energy outage, “critical mission operations on domestic
military installations for the Department of Defense (DoD) use
backup sources of power to protect against the failure of the
domestic electric utility grid [10].” Most Army installations use
diesel generators for backup power, but renewables offer
additional appeal for they are often grid-connected [11]. The
connection to the grid allows for redundancy of energy
production capability, and an opportunity to net meter power
production and generate income in the event the renewable
asset is producing excess power at a given moment. A greater
employment of renewables could help increase the net
resiliency gain of installations across the country [12].
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) are the most
common form of backup power used for critical loads in the
event of a grid failure [13]. On an Army installation, the
reliability of EDG varies based on size of post due to differing
critical loads of energy that must be produced. The reliability
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it is sold to consumers. Retail markets involve the sale of
electricity to consumers. Wholesale and retail markets can
incorporate regulated and competitive structures. Competitive
market structures typically use price signals to incentivize
electricity production and may allow customers to choose
between competitive suppliers. In ERCOT, the energy market
is composed of day-ahead and the real-time markets. The realtime market involves transactions that take place at varying
frequency (e.g. once every hour versus once every five minutes)
to help match supply and demand. Energy markets and capacity
markets differ in that capacity markets use regulated pricing and
incentives to ensure sufficient spare generation capacity is
available to meet variations in electricity demand. Customers in
regulated markets typically face higher prices for renewable
energy than those in competitive markets [20].

on a fractional basis to the hourly consumption curve for each
month of the year using the demand data from the EIA. The
final product is 12 distinct, 24-hour consumption curves
representing an average day for each month of the year at Fort
Benning. These average days were repeated for every day of the
relevant month with the inclusion of stochastic variations in the
magnitude of the demand curves to capture similar behavior to
what is seen day-to-day as a result of changes in weather, for
example. Notional examples of the consumption curves for
February and July are provided in Figure 1 showing the
summer-peaking behavior due to large air conditioning loads
and more mild winters in Georgia.
The inclusion of outage information and modeling of more
severe outages is one of the valuable contributions of this work.
Fort Benning’s normal outage are based on empirical data that
quantifies three different outage variables – frequency,
duration, and magnitude – from the year 2020. While these
outages are important, the model developed herein focuses on
the potential impact of a black swan event affecting Fort
Benning. A sensitivity analysis approach was used to consider
the wide-ranging possibility of what a large, unforeseen outage
event might do to the installation. The goal of the sensitivity
analysis was to illustrate the methodology for assessing energy
resilience by altering the three critical variables that define the
outage event: duration, frequency, and magnitude.
The outage event variables are input into the model with
separate informed probability distributions. Figure 2 illustrates
three potential probability distributions for each outage
variable: frequency, duration, and magnitude. The exponential
distribution, PDF1, represents the most likely scenario in terms
of all three variables. For example, for most outages, the
duration of that outage will be very small. Similarly, for the
large majority of outages, the damage of that outage will be
relatively minuscule. However, a small percentage of outages
have the potential to be a black swan event, where the duration
and magnitude of those events are abnormally large, creating
catastrophic energy shortage circumstances for an Army
installation. Each case explored by the modeling methodology
will illustrate how an installation’s energy is impacted given a
certain outage variable condition.

3. MODELING METHODOLOGY
The objective of modeling outages is to assess the overall
energy resilience of an Army installation. Fort Benning,
Georgia was used as a case study while developing the
modeling methodology. The ability to model the resilience of
the installation was done by leveraging the discrete event
simulation capability of ProModel. High resolution energy
data, in terms of spatial and temporal details, were curated for
Fort Benning. The use of the dataset as well as the simulation
constructed in ProModel allowed for discrete simulations of
Fort Benning’s energy supply, energy demand, and a history of
outage events. The simulation within ProModel treats
generation assets and buildings as supply and demand nodes,
respectively (i.e. as sources and sinks of energy). The nodes are
connected by simulated transmission lines which deliver
discrete packets of energy to balance supply and demand. The
four model input variables are electricity demand, electricity
supply, normal outages, and black swan outages. In the event of
an outage, the supply side is cutoff, resulting in a deficit of
energy for the remaining sources of demand. Outages of
varying severity could be modeled by changing the frequency,
magnitude, and duration of the energy deficit.
In the absence of an outage, the electricity supply and
demand at the installation is assumed to be equal, as would be
expected for any functional electric grid. Thus, the consumption
dataset that was collected from Fort Benning allowed for a
quantification of the necessary supply requirements for the
installation. Some critical assumptions for the energy structure
of Fort Benning are as follows: each month out of the year has
a distinct hourly demand curve, which is created using both
monthly metered data from each building on Fort Benning
between the years 2014-2019 and hourly consumption from the
EIA for the southeastern region of the United States [21]. The
metered monthly data is converted into average monthly
consumption for each of the 60 months within the data set.
Next, the average monthly consumption is filtered to an average
daily consumption value for each of the 60 months by dividing
by the number of days in the month. Lastly, the average daily
consumption by month throughout the entire five years is
created. The average daily consumption value is then applied

FIGURE 1: NOTIONAL EXAMPLE OF FORT BENNING
MONTHLY ENERGY DEMAND CURVES FOR FEBRUARY
AND JULY.
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The potential damage caused by a large hurricane was used
to help scale the average magnitude of a hypothetical black
swan events. For clarity: hurricanes are not black swans
because the storms are a well understood risk. However,
hurricanes do provide abundant data in terms of the potential
scope of damage that can be caused from a catastrophic weather
event. While the probability of a hurricane directly hitting Fort
Benning is low, the possibility of a catastrophic event is still
possible, whether it be natural or manmade.
Based on National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) data displayed in Figure 3, the return
period for a major hurricane striking along the GeorgiaAlabama border is about once every 40 years [22]. The potential
for a major storm event to occur once every 40 years was thus
defined as the 50th percentile of each frequency distribution.
Furthermore, the 50th percentile for each magnitude distribution
was approximately 56% of installation energy being wiped out
by a potential outage based on normalized damage data from
category 5 hurricanes in the United States over the past 100
years. Lastly, given the recent winter storm event in Texas that
affected power for about a week, the 50th percentile for duration
of outage was defined as one week. Based on these 50th
percentile values, probability distributions were developed for
each of the outage variables (e.g. exponential decay for
magnitude of a possible outage event).

4. MODELING RESULTS
One hundred years of energy supply and demand at Fort
Benning were modeled using the discrete event simulator.
Figure 4 shows an overview of these 100 years. In this figure,
energy supply is shown in green, energy demand is shown in
blue, and outage impact is shown in orange. Three black swan
events are highlighted in red boxes. In these large events,
outage impact affects over 50% of installation energy supply.
It is also possible to examine their large duration when zooming
in to these specific instances.
Figure 5 shows year 19 (i.e. hours 166,440—175,200) of
the 100-year simulation, zoomed in on the left most black swan
event from Figure 4. This shows greater resolution of the
energy supply and demand curves and the outages affecting
them. Each month has varying energy demand based on input
demand curves as described in Section 3, and this difference is
more pronounced here. The difference between supply and
demand is also more visible. Figure 5 is meant to provide
further context on what is being modeled on a monthly and
yearly basis.
Figure 6 shows the same black swan event as Figure 5
zoomed in to a two-week period. This figure shows what
happens in the model once an outage occurs. Prior to an outage,
demand equals supply. When an outage happens, supply
decreases based on whatever the magnitude of the outage is that
has appeared stochastically. Figure 6 shows the literal gap
between supply and demand once an outage occurs by showing
that supply no longer matches demand.

FIGURE 2: NOTIONAL AND NONDIMENSIONALIZED
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS TO COMPLETE
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF FREQUENCY, DURATION, AND
MAGNITUDE OF OUTAGE EVENTS.

FIGURE 4: 100-YEAR SIMULATION OF ENERGY SUPPLY
AND DEMAND AT FORT BENNING, INCLUDING BLACK
SWAN OUTAGE EVENTS.

FIGURE 3: MAJOR HURRICANE RETURN PERIOD [22]

FIGURE 5: ONE YEAR OF 100-YEAR SIMULATION AT FORT
BENNING.
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Figure 7 shows the same two-week span as Figure 6 with
an added example generator. In the model, the amount of
energy needed to make supply and demand equal again during
an outage is calculated and displayed, shown by the gray curve.
While this happens, the amount of cumulative backup energy
required to close the gap between supply and demand for the
duration of the outage is shown by the black curve. With these
outputs, it is possible to further investigate energy and fuel
requirements to cover simulated outages.
Figure 8 demonstrates a plausible method for achieving the
requirements outlined in Army Directive 2020-03. This method
involves decreasing energy demand when a large outage occurs
to the level needed to only cover the requirements for the
installation’s most critical facilities. In the case of this model,
critical facilities were assumed to account for 25% of normal
demand. The same outage event that was depicted in Figure 5
is shown here. However, in the example provided in Figure 8,
it is assumed the installation electricity demand also decreases
to the level needed to only cover critical facilities when an
outage occurs. This strategy would involve actively cutting
load to ensure that critical facilities remain operational.
Installation energy managers using this modeling methodology
in the future would be able to make more informed assumptions
regarding the proportion of critical energy needs on an
installation.

Figure 9 shows the energy generation and fuel
requirements for covering an outage where demand is
decreased. This example is meant to demonstrate the potential
effectiveness of decreasing energy demand to only cover
critical facilities when a large outage occurs while
simultaneously operating backup generation assets. Doing so
significantly decreases the amount of generated energy and
cumulative fuel needed to cover the outage. For this example,
generation and fuel requirements were less than a tenth of what
was needed to cover an outage when energy demand beyond
critical facilities was also included (i.e. the example shown in
Figure 7). As a reminder, all of the modeled results shown in
Figures 6—9 are based on the magnitude of the outage that was
identified in the 100-year simulation from Figures 4 and 5. The
only difference in Figures 6—9 is the exploration of how an
installation might respond to the outage event by either
providing greater backup generation assets or by cutting loads
that are not critical to meeting missions requirements.
Figure 10 shows the notional relationship between energy
reliability and marginal cost as informed by the results of the
model. For this figure, only the marginal cost of fuel is
considered; fuel storage infrastructure, distribution, and
maintenance costs are not included. As reliability increases
from 95% to 98%, the increase in cost is nearly linear.
However, above 98% the increase is exponential. This
relationship is expected as marginal benefits would decrease as

FIGURE 6: TWO WEEK SPAN EXPERIENCING 156 HOUR
BLACK SWAN EVENT.

FIGURE 8: TWO WEEK SPAN RESPONDING TO 156 HOUR
BLACK SWAN EVENT BY DECREASING DEMAND TO ONLY
COVER CRITICAL FACILITIES.

FIGURE 7: TWO WEEK SPAN EXPERIENCING 156 HOUR
BLACK SWAN EVENT WITH GENERATOR AND REQUIRED
BACKUP ENERGY NEEDED TO COVER OUTAGE.

FIGURE 9: GENERATOR AND REQUIRED BACKUP ENERGY
NEEDED TO RESPOND TO 156 HOUR BLACK SWAN EVENT
WHILE DECREASING DEMAND TO ONLY COVER CRITICAL
FACILITIES.
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The first step is to determine the cost of operations on a
dollars per soldier per day basis (i.e. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ). This will
achieve the goal of determining the level of resources that go
into producing the defense ability of the Army. The broadest
way to determine this value is to divide the annual budget of the
installation and its units, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 , by the number of soldiers
on the installation and then by the days in a year, as shown
below.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
# of soldiers × 365 days/yr

(1)

Ideally, the total cost should be split among the various
sectors or nodes on the installation. This can be done multiple
ways, with one possibility being levels of ‘critical,’ ‘essential,’
and ‘enhancing,’ to describe the importance of a particular node
to the overall mission of the installation.

FIGURE 10: NOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RELIABILITY AND FUEL COST BASED ON OBSERVED
RESULTS FROM MODEL.

an installation’s energy system becomes more reliable.
Factoring in infrastructure, distribution, and maintenance in
future work would yield a similar, albeit more drastic,
relationship due to the significant costs these factors would add.
The purpose of this outage model is to provide a
methodology for simulating possible outages and unplanned
events and informing recommendations for responding to them.
Several assumptions could be refined in future work. The three
distributions for black swan events could be refined for various
worse case scenarios that an installation energy manager would
like to plan for their given installation. Furthermore, the
amount of demand needed to cover critical facilities could also
be improved with installation-specific insight. Of note, the
results presented here often depicted gallons of diesel as the fuel
requirement to cover outages. This was used as a point of
reference. The model can be used to calculate the necessary
energy (or water) required to cover an outage, and a number of
alternative fuels or technologies could be applied in the same
way diesel was used here.

2: Map infrastructure relationships.
With available information, the relationships of the
infrastructure systems on the installation can be determined.
This includes the routing of power, water, and
telecommunication utilities across an installation, allowing
managers to determine the full extent of an outage on an
installation.
3: Assign cost-time relationships.
For each node, there will be a cost-time relationship, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡).
This relationship will depend on the function of the node and
its relative importance. The cost of an outage may increase
linearly, exponentially, or even logarithmically over the course
of an outage and must be developed with an understanding of
the mission of the installation.
5.2 Post-Outage
4: Track extent and duration of outage.

5. OUTAGE COST METHODOLOGY
The objective of the outage cost methodology is to create a
better understanding of the cost of outages to the mission of the
United States Army and the Department of Defense. Current
cost design methodology devalues the most extreme outage
events by using probabilities of occurrence when measuring
cost [23]. Creating projects that solve these black swan events
are often not deemed cost effective. Due to the mission of the
Army, these events must be considered and, in some cases,
prioritized. Army Directive 2020-03 outlines the expectation
of maintenance of operations in the event of a 14-day outage
event, which would fit the classification of a black swan event.
This framework will be a generalized approach to gauging the
costs to infrastructure failure and to weigh the benefits of
applying alternatives.

For the outage, consider all the nodes that are affected by
the outage event. This will include the level to which
performance is degraded. In this respect, performance can be
degraded to varying levels depending on the setup of the
infrastructure systems to include complete loss of function.
5: Sum the costs of all affected nodes.
With the established time functions and cost per hour of
operation, the costs over the entire outage event, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , can
be summarized. The end state of this step is a single value
dollar amount. An example for how the calculations would be
organized is shown in the following function.
𝑛𝑛

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)

5.1 Pre-Outage

𝑖𝑖=1

1: Determine the total cost of operations at an installation.
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6: Establish the parameters of an alternative.
With an alternative, one must establish the parameters
under which it will function. This includes the costs of
construction and operation, as well as how the alternative will
function to change the magnitude, duration, or frequency of
outages.
7: Measure impact of alternative on outage event.
Using the same outage event, determine the change in the
outage. Changes in the magnitude, duration, or extent of the
outage will influence what the final cost of the outage is. The
difference between the cost before the alternative and after is
the benefit of implementing the alternative.
8: Determine the Benefit-Cost ratio for an alternative.
For the implementation of an alternative, it will be viewed
as beneficial if the benefits of the alternative outweigh the costs.
As previously stated, the benefit is defined as the difference in
the cost of the outage before and after the alternative is
introduced (i.e. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 minus 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ).
𝐵𝐵

The benefit-cost ratio, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, is then defined as
𝐶𝐶

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐵𝐵
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑂𝑂&𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶

(3)

where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 include capital expenses (e.g. cost to
purchase and install hardware) and 𝑂𝑂&𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 are operation
and maintenance costs.
The complete methodology is displayed in the graphic of
Figure 11. Each box represents a step associated with the
numeric order of the steps discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 (i.e.
the yellow numbers in the bottom right corners of each box are
the corresponding sequence).

FIGURE 11: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
METHOD TO DETERMINE THE COST OF AN OUTAGE WITH
AND WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES.
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6. CASE STUDY RESULTS
The methodologies and results presented in Section 3, 4,
and 5 focused on the supply and demand of energy (e.g. kWh)
to showcase functionality of how to measure and respond to an
outage event. The same methods can be applied to water
infrastructure, except instead of measuring kWh the model
might be focused on millions of gallons (MG). This section
provides three case studies to showcase hypothetical results of
the methodology when applied to two energy-focused scenarios
and one water-focused scenario. For clarity: these case studies
are not intended to provide a detailed assessment of the
interrelated nature of energy and water that can result in
cascading failures of infrastructure.
Case Study #1- This case study mimics the black swan
event that was modeled in ProModel. Interpreted as a real-life
event, this is 50-year, severe weather event that directly hits
Fort Benning, damaging ~56% of electricity capacity for a
duration of seven days. This magnitude corresponds to 39 MW
of electric power removed from the system. Informed by
knowledge of the Fort Benning energy demand, it is assumed
that 20 MW are removed from normal operations that are not
mission essential (e.g. housing), another 15 MW from mission
enhancing (e.g. dining facilities), and the final 4 MW from
mission critical nodes (e.g. telecommunications).
The
alternative will be 15 MW of mobile generation, to be emplaced
within 10 hours of an outage.
Case Study #2- A coordinated attack by foreign actors
damages both water treatment plants that feed to Fort Benning.
Repair time is estimated at seven days. There is assumed to be
a total of 4 MG of water located in water tanks throughout Fort
Benning, enough for one day of average consumption. The
alternative in this situation is purchasing 11 3,000gph reverse
osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs) to satisfy 15% of
the water demand on post. This amount of water is assumed to
meet the basic human consumption and operational
requirements, the most critical operations.
Case Study #3- Outages occur intermittently on post due to
acts of nature and downed power lines. On average there are
10 events annually, at an average magnitude of 5 MW. The
alternative for this case study is routing 3 MW from a solar field
in the event of outages. It is assumed that these outages do not
influence the performance of mission-critical nodes. The
alternative would decrease the magnitude of a given outage, but
not the duration.
Table 1 shows the breakdown for each of these case
studies, to include their outage costs, implementation costs, and
benefit-cost ratio. In all three case studies, the benefit to cost
ratio was greater than 1, signifying that all alternatives would
bring a positive impact on the installation. The case studies
were evaluated without probability, in that it is assumed that the
outage magnitude will happen. As previously stated, traditional
cost estimation for outages factors in the probability of an event,
such as a 150-year storm. For the Army, considering events as
a definite event may be a necessary step to build secure
infrastructure systems. Using probability to determine whether
to implement resilient infrastructure would be akin to using the
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the diesel requirement is gallons. In practice, the fuel does not
need to be stored completely on Fort Benning, as long as a
supply chain can be maintained. Furthermore, auxiliary fuel
storage (e.g. two-weeks of diesel consumption for ROWPU)
kept onsite at Fort Benning could be considered to help address
concerns regarding interruption of the supply chain.

TABLE 1: CASE STUDY RESULTS
#1
15MW of Mobile
Generators

#2
11-3,000 gph
ROWPUs

#3
3-MW Solar
Power

Outage
Cost (1)

$763,000,000

$415,000,000

$210,000,000

Outage
Cost (2)

$260,000,000

$166,000,000

$126,000,000

Benefit

$503,000,000

$249,000,000

$84,000,000

Implement.
Cost

$20,000,000

$21,000,000 [24]

$17,000,000

B/C Ratio

25:1

12:1

5:1

7. CONCLUSIONS
Army installations must have energy and water resilience
to successfully project force to fight and win the Nation’s wars.
In the event of a large outage or damaging event, energy and
water can become limiting factors to mission readiness. This
work helps develop a framework for analyzing the
infrastructure requirements and associated cost of addressing
outage events of varying frequency, duration, and magnitude.
A case study approach was used to further highlight how
resilience can be understood in the context of maintaining
mission readiness for the Army. While historical outage data
can be used to predict the probability of future outages, robust
planning should also consider events that are unforeseen. The
chance of a black swan event remains a threat for all
installations. A different manner of estimating outage costs can
help to demonstrate the true impact of extreme outage events.
In the Army, the ability to deploy and defend the Nation is the
produced good; the cost of metered electricity is not the true
cost of an outage. By factoring in the impact of an outage over
time and weighing it against an alternative, energy managers
and installation commanders can make better decisions about
securing their ability to function during an outage event. The
methods developed in this study can help inform the decisionmaking process for installations across the Army, and may be
applied more broadly to other critical infrastructure in the
civilian and public sectors.

probability of an attack in combat on whether to build defenses.
As a result, it is likely that probability-based cost estimation
undervalues implementing alternatives to improve energy and
water resilience.
These case studies were simplified by setting specific
frequencies and magnitudes of outages.
They were
manufactured using knowledge of the installation, but also kept
vague to not cause security issues. The manipulation of outage
variables and parameters is at the discretion of those most
familiar with the situation of the installation. To determine
costs, the amount of energy or water lost was treated as a
percentage of functionality. In case study 2, the assumption
was made that a percentage decrease in water availability
corresponds to a same percentage decrease in functionality. For
all nodes this would not be the case, but in this case study it
made the most sense from a security perspective.
The benefit to cost ratio of the different case studies are
clearly influenced by the time-cost functions. Case studies 1
and 2 both include exponential functions for elements of the
outage. Case study 1 was particularly extreme, given the outage
scenario and the assumptions made in locating the impacts of
the outage. This was not the case with the periodic minor
outages in case study 3, with the outages not being located in a
mission-critical area. In practice, determining the time-cost
relationships for nodes on an installation are not the job of a
single person. It requires knowledge of both the essential
missions of the installation and the status of power and water
distribution. If costs were only estimated by the magnitude of
an outage, there would be the possibility of overlooking the
critical nature of specific infrastructure nodes that could have
disproportionally high impacts on the mission readiness of an
installation even if the magnitude, duration, or frequency of the
outage event was small.
The case studies and alternatives discussed herein also
demonstrate the necessity for planned fuel storage. Both the
generator and ROWPU use diesel as fuel, with each having a
set rate of consumption to produce its necessary output on an
hourly basis. For the mobile generation, the fuel requirement is
a product of the power production, the fuel consumption rate,
and the hours that the generators are online. For case study #1,
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